The third foundation of the Faith is called Ijma, a word signifying to be collected or assembled. Technically it means the unanimous consent of the leading theologians, or what in Christian theology would be called the "unanimous consent of the Fathers." Practically it is a collection of the opinions of the Companions, the Tábi'ín and the Taba-i-Tábi'ín. "The Law," says Ibn Khaldoun
"is grounded on the general accord of the Companions and their followers." The election of Abu Bakr to the Khalifate is called Ijma'-i-Ummat, the unanimous consent of the whole sect. The Companions of the Prophet had special knowledge of the various circumstances under which special revelations had been made; they alone knew which verses of the Qurán abrogated others, and which verses were thus abrogated. The knowledge of these matters and many other details they handed on to their successors, the Tábi'ín, who passed the information on to their followers, the Taba-i-Tábi'ín. Some Muslims, the Wahhábís for example, accept only the Ijma of the Companions; and by all sects that is placed in the first rank as regards authority; others accept that of the 'Fugitives' who dwelt at Madína; and there are some amongst the orthodox who allow, as a matter of theory, that Ijma may be collected at any time, but that practically it is not done because there are now no Mujtahidín.
The highest rank a Muslim Theologian could reach was that of a Mujtahid, or one who could make an Ijtihád, a word which, derived from the same root as Jihád (a Crescentade), means in its technical sense a logical deduction. It is defined as the "attaining to a certain degree of authority in searching into the principles of jurisprudence." The origin of Ijtihád was as follows:—Muhammad wished to send a man named Mu'áz to Yaman to receive some money collected for alms, which he was then to distribute to the poor. On appointing him he said: "O Mu'áz, by what rule will you act?" He replied, "by the Law of the Qurán." "But if you find no direction therein?" "Then I will act according to the Sunnat of the Prophet." "But what if that fails?" "Then I will make an Ijtihád and act on that." The Prophet raised his hands and said, "Praise be to God who guides the messenger of His Prophet in what He pleases." This is considered a proof of the authority of Ijtihád for the Prophet clearly sanctioned it.
When the Prophet was alive men could go to him with their doubts and fears: an infallible authority was always present ready to give an inspired direction. The Khalífs who succeeded the Prophet had only to administer the Law according to the opinions which they knew Muhammad had held. They were busily engaged in carrying on the work of conquest; they neither attempted any new legislation, nor did they depart from the practice of him whom they revered. "In the first days of Islám, the knowledge of the Law was purely Traditional. In forming their judgments they had no recourse either to speculation, to private opinion, or to arguments founded upon analogy." However, as the Empire grew, new conditions of life arose, giving rise to questions, concerning which Muhammad had given no explicit direction.
This necessitated the use of Ijtihád. During the Khalifates of Abu Bakr, Omar, Osmán and 'Alí—the Khulafa-i-Ráshidín, or the Khalífs who could guide men in the right way, the custom was for the Faithful to consult them as to the course of action to be pursued under some new development of circumstances; for they knew as none other did the Prophet's sayings and deeds, they could recall to their memories a saying or an act from which a decision could be deduced. In this way all Muslims could feel that in following their judgments and guidance they were walking in the right path. But after the death of 'Alí, the fourth Khalíf, civil war and hostile factions imperilled the continuance of the Faith in its purity. At Madína, where Muhammad's career as a recognised Prophet was best known, devout men commenced to learn by heart the Qurán, the Sunnat, and the analogical judgments (Ijtihád) of the four Khalífs. These men were looked up to as authorities, and their decisions were afterwards known as the 'Customs of Madína.'
It is not difficult to see that a system, which sought to regulate all departments of life, all developments of men's ideas and energies by the Sunnat and analogical deductions therefrom, was one which not only gave every temptation a system could give to the manufacture of Tradition, but one which would soon become too cumbersome to be of practical use. Hence, it was absolutely necessary to systematize all this incoherent mass of Tradition, of judgments given by Khalífs and Mujtahidín. This gave rise to the systems of jurisprudence, founded by the four orthodox Imáms, to one or other of which all Muslims, except the Shía'hs, belong. These Imáms, Abu Hanífa, Ibn Málik, As-Sháfi'i and Ibn Hanbal were all Mujtahidín of the highest rank. After them it is the orthodox belief that there has been no Mujtahid. Thus in a standard theological book much used in India it is written: "Ijma is this, that it is not lawful to follow any other than the four Imáms." "In these days the Qází must make no order, the Muftí give no fatvá (i.e. a legal decision), contrary to the opinion of the four Imáms." "To follow any other is not lawful." So far then as orthodoxy is concerned, change and progress are impossible.
Imám Abu Hanífa was born at Basra (A.H. 80), but he spent the greater part of his life at Kúfa. He was the founder and teacher of the body of legists known as 'the jurists of Irák.' His system differs considerably from that of the Imám Málik who, living at Madína, confined himself chiefly to Tradition as the basis of his judgments. Madína was full of the memories of the sayings and acts of the Prophet; Kúfa, the home of Hanífa, on the contrary, was not founded till after the Prophet's death and so possessed none of his memories. Islám there came into contact with other races of men, but from them it had nothing to learn. If these men became Muslims, well and good: if not, the one law for them as for the Faithful was the teaching of Muhammad. Various texts of the Qurán are adduced to prove the correctness of this position. "For to thee have we sent down the book which cleareth up every thing." (Súra xvi. 91) "Nothing have we passed over in the book." (Súra vi. 38.) "Neither is there a grain in the darkness of the earth nor a thing green or sere, but it is noted in a distinct writing." (Súra vi. 59). These texts were held to prove that all law was provided for by anticipation in the Qurán. If a verse could not be found bearing on any given question, analogical deduction was resorted to. Thus: "He it is who created for you all that is on earth." (Súra ii. 27). According to the Hanifite jurists, this is a deed of gift which annuls all other rights of property. The 'you' refers to Muslims. The earth may be classified under three heads:—(1) land which never had an owner; (2) land which had an owner and has been abandoned; (3) the person and property of the Infidels. From the last division the same legists deduce the lawfulness of slavery, piracy and constant war against the unbelievers. To return to Abu Hanífa. He admitted very few Traditions as authoritative in his system, which claims to be a logical development from the Qurán. "The merit of logical fearlessness cannot be denied to it. The wants and wishes of men, the previous history of a country—all those considerations, in fact, which are held in the West to be the governing principles of legislation, are set aside by the legists of Irák as being of no account whatever. Legislation is not a science inductive and experimental, but logical and deductive."
Imám Ibn Málik was born at Madína (A.H. 93) and his system of jurisprudence is founded, as might be expected from his connection with the sacred city, on the "Customs of Madína." His business was to arrange and systematize the Traditions current in Madína, and to form out of them and the "Customs" a system of jurisprudence embracing the whole sphere of life. The treatise composed by him was called the "Muwatta" or "The Beaten Path." The greater part of its contents are legal maxims and opinions
delivered by the Companions.
His system of jurisprudence, therefore, has been described as historical and traditional. In an elegy on his death by Abu Muhammad Ja'far it is said: "His Traditions were of the greatest authority; his gravity was impressive; and when he delivered them, all his auditors were plunged in admiration." The Traditions were his great delight. "I delight," said he, "in testifying my profound respect for the sayings of the Prophet of God, and I never repeat one unless I feel myself in a state of perfect purity," (i.e., after performing a legal ablution.) As death approached, his one fear was lest he should have exercised his private judgment in delivering any legal opinion. In his last illness a friend went to visit him, and enquiring why he wept, received the following answer: "Why should I not weep, and who has more right to weep than I? By Allah! I wish I had been flogged and reflogged for every question of law on which I pronounced an opinion founded on my own private judgment."
Imám As-Sháfa'í, a member of the Quraish tribe, was born A.H. 150. He passed his youth at Mecca but finally settled in Cairo where he died (A.H. 204). Ibn Khallikan relates of him that he was unrivalled for his knowledge of the Qurán, the Sunnat, and the sayings of the Companions. "Never," said Imám Ibn Hanbal, "have I passed a night without praying for God's mercy and blessing upon As-Sháfi'í." "Whosoever pretends," said Abu Thaur, "that he saw the like of As-Sháfi'í for learning is a liar." Having carefully studied the systems of the two preceding Imáms he then proceeded on an eclectic system to form his own. It was a reaction against the system of Abu Hanífa. As-Sháfi'í follows rather the traditional plan of Ibn Málik. The Hanifite will be satisfied if, in the absence of a clear and a direct statement, he finds one passage in the Qurán, or one Tradition from which the required judgment may be deduced. The Sháfi'ite in the same circumstances, if Tradition is the source of his deduction, will require a considerable number of Traditions from which to make it.
Imám Ibn Hanbal was the last of the four Orthodox Imáms. He was born at Baghdád (A.H. 164). His system is a distinct return to Traditionalism. He lived at Baghdád during the reign of the Khalíf Mamun, when Orthodox Islám seemed in danger of being lost amid the rationalistic speculations, (that is, from an Orthodox Muslim stand-point), and licentious practices of the Court. The jurists most in favour at Court were followers of Abu Hanífa. They carried the principle of analogical deduction to dangerous lengths in order to satisfy the latitudinarianism of the Khalíf. Human speculation seemed to be weakening all the essentials of the Faith. Ibn Hanbal met the difficulty by discarding altogether the principle of analogical deduction. At the same time he saw that the Máliki system, founded as it was on the "Customs of Madína," was ill-suited to meet the wants of a great and growing Empire. It needed to be supplemented. What better, what surer ground could he go upon than the Traditions. These at least were inspired, and thus formed a safer foundation on which to build a system of jurisprudence than the analogical deductions of Abu Hanífa did. The system of Ibn Hanbal has almost ceased to exist. There is now no Muftí of this sect at Mecca, though the other three are represented there. Still his influence is felt to this day in the importance he attached to Tradition.
The distinction between the four Imáms has been put in this way. Abu Hanífa exercised his own judgment. Málik and Hanbal preferred authority and precedent. As-Sháfi'í entirely repudiated reason. They differ, too, as regards the value of certain Traditions, but to each of them an authentic Tradition is an incontestable authority. Their opinion on points of doctrine and practice forms the third basis of the Faith.
The Ijma of the four Imáms is a binding law upon all Sunnís. It might be supposed that as the growing needs of the Empire led to the formation of these schools of interpretation; so now the requirements of modern, social and political life might be met by fresh Imáms making new analogical deductions. This is not the case. The orthodox belief is, that since the time of the four Imáms there has been no Mujtahid who could do as they did. If circumstances should arise which absolutely require some decision to be arrived at, it must be given in full accordance with the 'mazhab,' or school of interpretation, to which the person framing the decision belongs. This effectually prevents all change, and by excluding innovation, whether good or bad, keeps Islám stationary. Legislation is now purely deductive. Nothing must be done contrary to the principles contained in the jurisprudence of the four Imáms. "Thus, in any Muhammadan State legislative reforms are simply impossible. There exists no initiative. The Sultán, or Khalíf can claim the allegiance of his people only so long as he remains the exact executor of the prescriptions of the Law."
The question then as regards the politics of the "Eastern Question" is not whether Muhammad was a deceiver or self-deceived, an apostle or an impostor; whether the Qurán is on the whole good or bad; whether Arabia was the better or the worse for the change Muhammad wrought; but what Islám as a religious and political system has become and is, how it now works, what Orthodox Muslims believe and how they act in that belief. The essence of that belief is, that the system as taught by Prophet, Khalífs and Imáms is absolutely perfect. Innovation is worse than a mistake. It is a crime, a sin. This completeness, this finality of his system of religion and polity, is the very pride and glory of a true Muslim. To look for an increase of light in the knowledge of his relation to God and the unseen world, in the laws which regulate Islám on earth is to admit that Muhammad's revelation was incomplete, and that admission no Muslim will make.
It has been stated on high authority that all that is required for the reform of Turkey is that the Qánúns or orders of the Sultán should take the place of the Sharí'at or law of Islám. Precisely so; if this could be done, Turkey might be reformed; but Islám would cease to be the religion of the State. That the law as formulated by the Imám Abu Hanífa ill suits the conditions of modern life is more than probable; but it is the very function of the Khalíf of Islám, which the Sultán claims to be, to maintain it. He is no Mujtahid, for such there are not now amongst the Sunnís, to which sect the Turks belong. If through stress of circumstances some new law must be made, orthodoxy demands that it should be strictly in accordance with the opinions of the Imáms. The Shía'hs, in opposition to the Sunnís, hold that there are still Mujtahidín, but this opinion arises from their peculiar doctrine of the Imámat, a subject we shall discuss a little later on. At first sight it would seem that if there can be Mujtahidín who are now able to give authoritative opinions, there may be some hope of enlightened progress amongst Shía'h people—the Persians for example. There is doubtless amongst them more religious unrest, more mysticism, more heresy, but they are no further on the road of progress than their neighbours; and the apparent advantage of the presence of a Mujtahid is quite nullified by the fact that all his decisions must be strictly in accordance with the Qurán and the Sunnat, or rather with what to the Shía'h stands in the place of the Sunnat. The Shía'h, as well as the Sunní, must base all legislation on the fossilized system of the past, not on the living needs of the present. Precedent rules both with an iron sway. The Wahhábís reject all Ijma except that of the Companions, but that they accept; so when they are called the Puritans of Islám, it must be remembered that they accept as a rule of faith not only the Qurán, but the Sunnat, and some Ijma.
In order to make Ijma binding, it is necessary that the Mujtahidín should have been unanimous in their opinion or in their practice.
The whole subject of Ijtihád is one of the most important in connection with the possibility of reforms in a Muslim state. A modern Muhammadan writer seeking to show that Islám does possess a capacity for progress and that so far from being a hard and fast system, it is able to adapt itself to new circumstances, because the Prophet ushered in "an age of active principles," uses the story I have already related when describing the origin of Ijtihád to prove the accuracy of his statement. He makes Mu'áz to say:—"I will look first to the Qurán, then to precedents of the Prophet, and lastly rely upon my own judgment." It is true that Ijtihád literally means 'great effort,' it is true that the Companions and Mujtahidín of the first class had the power of exercising their judgment in doubtful cases, and of deciding them according to their sense of the fitness of things, provided always, that their decision contravened no law of the Qurán or the Sunnat; but this in no way proves that Islám has any capacity for progress, or that "an age of active principles" was ushered in by Muhammad, or that his "words breathe energy and force, and infuse new life into the dormant heart of humanity." For, though the term Ijtihád might, in reference to the men I have mentioned, be somewhat freely translated as "one's own judgment," it can have no such meaning now. It is a purely technical term, and its use and only use now is to express the "referring of a difficult case to some analogy drawn from the Qurán and the Sunnat." But even were the meaning not thus restricted, even though it meant now as it sometimes meant at first, "one's own judgment;" still Syed Amír 'Alí's position would remain to be proved for, since the days of the four Imáms, the orthodox believe that there has been no Mujtahid of the first class, and to none but men of this rank has such power ever been accorded. Thus granting, for the sake of argument merely, that the Syed's translation is grammatically and technically correct, all that results from it is that the "age of active principles" lasted only for two centuries. I do not admit that there ever was such an age in Islám, and certainly neither its theological development, nor its political growth negative the opposite assertion, viz., that Muhammad gave precepts rather than principles. The Turks are included in "the dormant heart of humanity," but it is difficult to see what "energy and force" is breathed, what "new life is infused" into them by the "wonderful words" of the Prophet, or what lasting good the "age of active principles" has produced.
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