The essential attributes are Life, Knowledge, Power, Will, for without these the others could not exist. Then the attributes of Hearing, Seeing, Speech give us a further idea of perfection. These are the "Sifát-i-Sabútiah," or affirmative attributes, the privation of which would imply loss; there are also Sifát-i-Salbiah, or privative attributes, such as—God has no form, is not limited by place, has no equal, &c. The acts of sitting, rising, descending, the possession of face, hands, eyes, &c., being connected with the idea of corporeal existences imply imperfection and apparently contradict the doctrine of "exemption" (tenzih) according to which God is, in virtue of His essence, in no way like the creatures He has made. This was a difficulty, but the four great Imáms all taught that it was impious to enquire into these matters for all such allusions were mutashábih. "
The Imám Hanbal and other early divines followed in the path of the early Muslims and said: 'We believe in the Book and the Sunnat, and do not desire explanations. We know that the High God is not to be compared to any created object: nor any creature with Him.'" Imám As-Sháfa'í said that a man who enquired into such matters should be tied to a stake, and carried about, and that the following proclamation should be made before him: "This is the reward of him who left the Qurán and the Traditions for the study of scholastic theology." Imám Hanbal says: "Whosoever moves his hand when he reads in the Qurán the words, 'I have created with my hand,' ought to have his hand cut off; and whoever stretches forth his finger in repeating the saying of Muhammad, 'The heart of the believer is between two fingers of the Merciful,' deserves to have his finger cut off." At-Tirmízí when consulted about the statement of the Prophet that God had descended to the lowest of the seven heavens, said: "The descent is intelligible, the manner how is unknown; the belief therein
is obligatory; and the asking about it is a blameable innovation." But all such attempts to restrain discussion and investigation failed.
The two main points in the discussion of this question are (1) whether the attributes of God are internal or external, whether they are part of His essence or not, and (2) whether they are eternal or not.
The two leading Sects were the Sifátians (or Attributists) and the Mutazilites. The Sifátians whom the early orthodox Muslims follow, taught that the attributes of God are eternally inherent in His essence without separation or change. Every attribute is conjoined with Him as life with knowledge, or knowledge with power. They also taught that the mutashábih verses were not to be explained, and such were those which seemed to show a resemblance between God and His creatures. So at first they did not attempt to give the meaning of the terms, "hands, eyes, face, &c.," when applied to God. They simply accepted them as they stood. In course of time, as will be seen, differences of opinion on this point led to some sub-divisions of this sect.
The Mutazilites were the great opponents of the Sifátians. They rejected the idea of eternal attributes, saying that eternity was the formal attribute of the essence of God. "If," said they, "we admit the eternal existence of an attribute then we must recognize the multiplicity of eternal existences." They also rejected the attributes of hearing, seeing and speech, as these were accidents proper to corporeal existences. They looked upon the divine attributes as mental abstractions, and not as having a real existence in the divine essence. The Mutazilites were emphatically the Free thinkers of Islám. The origin of the sect was as follows: Al Hasan, a famous divine, was one day seated in the Mosque at Basra when a discussion arose on the question whether a believer who committed a mortal sin became thereby an unbeliever. The Khárigites [125]affirmed that it was so. The orthodox denied this, saying that, though guilty of sin, yet that as he believed rightly he was not an infidel. One of the scholars Wásil Ibn Atá, (who was born at Madína A.H. 80), then rose up and said: "I maintain that a Muslim who has committed a mortal sin should be regarded neither as a believer nor an unbeliever, but as occupying a middle station between the two." He then retired to another part of the Mosque where he was joined by his friend 'Umr Ibn Obaid and others. They resumed the discussion. A learned man, named Katáda, entering the Mosque, went up to them, but on finding that they were not the party in which Al Hasan was, said 'these are the Seceders (Al-Mutazila).' Al Hasan soon expelled them from his school. Wásil then founded a school of his own of which, after the death of his master, 'Umr Ibn Obaid became the head.
Wásil felt that a believer, though sinful, did not merit the same degree of punishment as an infidel, and thus starting off on the question of degrees of punishment, he soon opened up the whole subject of man's responsibility and the question of free-will. This soon brought him into conflict with the orthodox on the subject of predestination and that again to the subject of the inspiration, the interpretation and the eternity of the Qurán, and of the divine attributes. His followers rejected the doctrine of the "divine right" of the Imám, and held that the entire body of the Faithful had the right to elect the most suitable person, who need not necessarily be a man of the Quraish tribe, to fill that office. The principles of logic and the teaching of philosophy were brought to bear on the precepts of religion. According to Shahrastání the Mutazilites hold:—
"That God is eternal; and that eternity is the peculiar property of His essence; but they deny the existence of any eternal attributes (as distinct from His nature). For they say, He is Omniscient as to His nature; Living as to His nature; Almighty as to His nature; but not through any knowledge, power or life existing in Him as eternal attributes; for knowledge, power and life are part of His essence, otherwise, if they are to be looked upon as eternal attributes of the Deity, it will give rise to a multiplicity of eternal entities."
"They maintain that the knowledge of God is as much within the province of reason as that of any other entity; that He cannot be beheld with the corporeal sight; and with the exception of Himself everything else is liable to change or to suffer extinction. They also maintain that Justice is the animating principle of human actions: Justice according to them being the dictates of Reason and the concordance of the ultimate results of this conduct of man with such dictates."
"Again, they hold that there is no eternal law as regards human actions; that the divine ordinances which regulate the conduct of men are the results of growth and development; that God has commanded and forbidden, promised and threatened by a law which grew gradually. At the same time, say they, he who works righteousness merits rewards and he who works evil deserves punishment. They also say, that all knowledge is attained through reason, and must necessarily be so obtained. They hold that the cognition of good and evil is also within the province of reason; that nothing is known to be right or wrong until reason has enlightened us as to the distinction; and that thankfulness for the blessings of the Benefactor is made obligatory by reason, even before the promulgation of any law upon the subject. They also maintain that man has perfect freedom; is the author of his actions both good and evil, and deserves reward or punishment hereafter accordingly."
During the reigns of the 'Abbásside Khalífs Mámún, Mutasim and Wathik (198-232 A.H.) at Baghdád, the Mutazilites were in high favour at Court, Under the 'Abbásside dynasty the ancient Arab Society was revolutionized, Persians filled the most important offices of State; Persian doctrines took the place of Arab ones. The orthodox suffered bitter persecution. The story of that persecution will be told later on. The Khalíf Wathik at length relented.
An old man, heavily chained, was one day brought into his presence. The prisoner obtained permission to put a few questions to Ahmad Ibn Abu Dá,úd, a Mutazilite and the President of the Court of Inquisition. The following dialogue took place. "Ahmad," said the prisoner, "what is the dogma which you desire to have established." "That the Qurán is created," replied Ahmad. "This dogma, then, is without doubt an essential part of religion, insomuch that the latter cannot without it be said to be complete?" "Certainly." "Has the Apostle of God taught this to men or has he left them free?" "He has left them free." "Was the Apostle of God acquainted with this dogma or not?" "He was acquainted with it." "Wherefore, then, do you desire to impose a belief regarding which the Apostle of God has left men free to think as they please?" Ahmad remaining silent, the old man turned to Wathik and said, "O Prince of Believers, here is my first position made good." Then turning to Ahmad, he said, "God has said, 'This day have I perfected religion for you, and have filled up the measures of my favours upon you; and it is my pleasure that Islám be your religion.' (Súra v. 5). But according to you Islám is not perfected unless we adopt this doctrine that the Qurán is created. Which now is most worthy of credence—God, when He declares Islám to be complete and perfect, or you when you announce the contrary?" Ahmad was still silent. "Prince of Believers," said the old man, "there is my second point made good."
He continued, "Ahmad, how do you explain the following words of God in His Holy Book?—'O Apostle! proclaim all that hath been sent down to thee from thy Lord; for if thou dost not, thou hast not proclaimed His message at all.' Now this doctrine that you desire to spread among the Faithful, has the Apostle taught it, or has he abstained from doing so?" Ahmad remained silent. The old man resumed, "Prince of Believers, such is my third argument." Then turning to Ahmad he said: "If the Prophet was acquainted with the doctrine
which you desire to impose upon us, had he the right to pass by it in silence?" "He had the right." "And did the same right appertain to Abu Bakr, Omar, Osmán and 'Ali?" "It did," "Prince of Believers," said the prisoner, "God will, in truth, be severe on us, if He deprives us of a liberty which He accorded to the Prophet and his Companions." The Khalíf assented, and at once restored the old man to liberty. So ended one of the fiercest persecutions the orthodox have ever had to endure, but so also ended the attempt to break through the barriers of traditionalism. The next Khalíf, Al Mutawakhil, a ferocious and cruel man, restored the orthodox party to place and power. He issued a fatva (decree) declaring that the dogma that the Qurán was created was an utter falsehood. He instituted severe measures against Christians, Jews, Shía'hs and Mutazilites. Ahmad Ibn Abu Dá,úd was one of the first to be disgraced. Heresy and latitudinarianism were banished.
The final blow to the Mutazilites, however, came not from the Khalíf but a little later on from Abu Hasan-al-Ash'arí (270-340 A.H.)
The Mutazilites expelled from power in Baghdád, still flourished at Basra where one day the following incident occurred. Abu 'Alí Al-Jubbai, a Mutazilite doctor, was lecturing to his students when Al-Ash'arí propounded the following case to his master: "There were three brothers, one of whom was a true believer, virtuous and pious; the second an infidel, a debauchee and a reprobate; and the third an infant; they all died. What became of them?" Al-Jubbai answered: "The virtuous brother holds a high station in Paradise, the infidel is in the depths of hell, and the child is among those who have obtained salvation."
"Suppose now," said Al-Ash'arí, "that the child should wish to ascend to the place occupied by his virtuous brother, would he be allowed to do so?" "No," replied Al-Jubbai, "it would be said to him: 'thy brother arrived at this place through His numerous works of obedience to God, and thou hast no such works to set forward.'" "Suppose then," said Al-Ash'arí, "that the child should say: 'this is not my fault, you did not let me live long enough, neither did you give me the means of proving my obedience.'"
"In that case," said Al-Jubbai, "the Almighty would say: 'I knew that if I allowed thee to live, thou wouldest have been disobedient and have incurred the punishment of hell: I acted, therefore, for thy advantage.'" "Well," said Al-Ash'arí, "and suppose the infidel brother were here to say: 'O God of the Universe! since Thou knowest what awaited him, Thou must have known what awaited me; why then didst Thou act for his advantage and not for mine?'" Al-Jubbai was silent, though very angry with his pupil, who was now convinced that the Mutazilite dogma of man's free-will was false, and that God elects some for mercy and some for punishment without any motive whatever. Disagreeing with his teacher on this point, he soon began to find other points of difference, and soon announced his belief that the Qurán was not created. This occurred on a Friday in the Great Mosque at Basra. Seated in his chair he cried out in a loud voice: "They who know me know who I am; as for those who do not know me I shall tell them; I am 'Alí Ibn Ismá'íl Al-Ash'arí, and I used to hold that the Qurán was created, that the eyes (of men) shall not see God, and that we ourselves are the authors of our evil deeds; now, I have returned to the truth: I renounce these opinions, and I take the engagement to refute the Mutazilites and expose their infamy and turpitude."
He then, adopting scholastic methods, started a school of thought of his own, which was in the main a return to orthodoxy. The Ash'arían doctrines differ slightly from the tenets of the Sifátians of which sect Al-Ash'arí's disciples form a branch. The Ash'aríans hold—
(i.) That the attributes of God are distinct from His essence, yet in such a way as to forbid any comparison being made between God and His creatures. They say they are not "'ain nor ghair:" not of His essence, nor distinct from it: i.e., they cannot be compared with any other things.
(ii.) That God has one eternal will from which proceed all things, the good and the evil, the useful and the hurtful. The destiny of man was written on the eternal table before the world was created. So far they go with the Sifátians, but in order to preserve the moral responsibility of man they say that he has power to convert will into action. But this power cannot create anything new for then God's sovereignty would be impaired; so they say that God in His providence so orders matters that whenever "a man desires to do a certain thing, good or bad, the action corresponding to the desire is, there and then, created by God, and, as it were, fitted on to the desire."
Thus it seems as if it came naturally from the will of the man, whereas it does not. This action is called Kasb (acquisition) because it is acquired by a special creative act of God. It is an act directed to the obtaining of profit, or the removing of injury: the term is, therefore, inapplicable to the Deity. Abu Bakr-al-Bakillání, a disciple of Al-Ash'arí, says: "The essence or substance of the action is the effect of the power of God, but its being an action of obedience, such as prayer, or an action of disobedience, such as fornication, are qualities of the action, which proceed from the power of man." The Imám Al-Haramain (419-478 A.H.) held "that the actions of men were effected by the power which God has created in man." Abu Isháq al Isfarayain says: "That which maketh impression, or hath influence on action, is a compound of the power of God and the power of man."
(iii.) They say that the word of God is eternal, though they acknowledge that the vocal sounds used in the Qurán, which is the manifestation of that word, are created. They say, in short, that the Qurán contains (1) the eternal word which existed in the essence of God before time was; and (2) the word which consists of sounds and combinations of letters. This last they call the created word.
Thus Al-Ash'arí traversed the main positions of the Mutazilites, denying that man can by the aid of his reason alone rise to the knowledge of good and evil. He must exercise no judgment but accept all that is revealed. He has no right to apply the moral laws which affect men to the actions of God. It cannot be asserted by the human reason that the good will be rewarded, or the bad punished in a future world. Man must always approach God as a slave, in whom there is no light or knowledge to judge of the actions of the Supreme. Whether God will accept the penitent sinner or not cannot be asserted, for He is an absolute Sovereign, above all law.
The opinions of the more irrational sub-divisions of the Sifátians need not be entered into at any length.
The Mushábihites (or Assimilators), interpreting some of the mutashábih verses literally, held that there is a resemblance between God and His creatures; and that the Deity is capable of local motion, of ascending, descending, &c. These they called "declarative attributes." The Mujassimians (or Corporealists) declared God to be corporeal, by which some of them meant, a self-subsisting body, whilst others declared the Deity to be finite. They are acknowledged to be heretics.
The Jabríans gave great prominence to the denial of free agency in man, and thus opposed the Mutazilites, who in this respect are Kadríans, that is, they deny "Al-Kadr," God's absolute sovereignty, and recognize free will in man.
These and various other sub-divisions are not now of much importance. The Sunnís follow the teaching of Al-Ash'arí, whilst the Shí'ahs incline to that of the Mutazilites.
Connected with the subject of the attributes of God is that of the names to be used when speaking of Him. All sects agree in this, that the names "The Living, the Wise, the Powerful, the Hearer, the Seer, the Speaker," &c., are to be applied to God; but the orthodox belief is that all such names must be "tauqífi," that is dependent on some revelation. Thus it is not lawful to apply a name to God expressive of one of His attributes, unless there is some statement made, or order given by Muhammad to legalize it. God is rightly called Sháfí (Healer), but He cannot be called Tabíb which means much the same thing, for the simple reason that the word Tabíb is never applied in the Qurán or the Traditions to God. In like manner the term 'Álim (Knower) is lawful, but not so the expression 'Áqil (Wise). The Mutazilites say that if, in the Qurán or Traditions, there is any praise of an attribute, then the adjective formed from the name of that attribute can be applied to God even though the actual word does not occur in any revelation. Al-Ghazzálí (A.H. 450-505), who gave in the East the death-blow to the Muslim philosophers, says: "The names of God not given in the Law, if expressive of His glory, may be used of Him, but only as expressive of His attributes, not of His nature." On the ground that it does not occur in the Law, the Persian word "Khuda" has been objected to, an objection which also holds good with regard to the use of such terms as God, Dieu, Gott, &c. To this it is answered, that as "Khuda" means "one who comes by himself" it is equivalent to the term Wájib-ul-Wajúd, "one who has necessary existence," and therefore so long as it is not considered as the "Ism-i-Zát (name of His nature) it may with propriety be used."
The current belief now seems to be that the proper name equal to the term Alláh, current in a language, can be used, provided always that such a name is not taken from the language of the Infidels; so God, Dieu, &c, still remain unlawful. The names of God authorised by the Qurán and Traditions are, exclusive of the term Alláh, ninety-nine in number. They are called the Asmá-i-Husná (noble names); but in addition to these there are many synonyms used on the authority of Ijmá'. Such are Hanán, equal to Rahím (Merciful) and Manán, "one who puts another under an obligation." In the Tafsír-i-Bahr it is stated that there are three thousand names of God; one thousand of which are known to angels; one thousand to prophets; whilst one thousand are thus distributed, viz., in the Pentateuch there are three hundred, in the Psalms three hundred, in the Gospels three hundred, in the Qurán ninety-nine, and one still hidden.
The following texts of the Qurán are adduced to prove the nature of the divine attributes:—
(1). Life. "There is no God but He, the Living, the Eternal." (Súra ii. 256). "Put thy trust in Him that liveth and dieth not." (Súra xxv. 60).
(2). Knowledge. "Dost thou not see that God knoweth all that is in the heavens, and all that is in the earth." (Súra lviii. 8). "With Him are the keys of the secret things; none knoweth them but He: He knoweth whatever is on the land and in the sea; and no leaf falleth but He knoweth it; neither is there a grain in the darknesses of the earth, nor a thing green or sere, but it is noted in a distinct writing." (Súra vi. 59).
(3). Power. "If God pleased, of their ears and of their eyes would He surely deprive them. Verily God is Almighty." (Súra ii. 19). "Is He not powerful enough to quicken the dead." (Súra lxxv. 40). "God hath power over all things." (Súra iii. 159.)
(4). Will. "God is worker of that He willeth." (Súra lxxxv. 16). "But if God pleased, He would surely bring them, one and all, to the guidance." (Súra vi. 35). "God misleadeth whom He will, and whom He will He guideth—God doeth His pleasure." (Súra xiv. 4, 32).
As this attribute is closely connected with the article of the Creed which refers to Predestination, the different opinions regarding it will be stated under that head.
There has never been any difference of opinion as to the existence of these four attributes so clearly described in the Qurán: the difference is with regard to the mode of their existence and their operation. There is, first, the ancient Sifátian doctrine that the attributes are eternal and of the essence of God: secondly, the Mutazilite theory that they are not eternal; and, thirdly, the Ash'arían dogma that they are eternal, but distinct from His essence.
There is also great difference of opinion with regard to the next three attributes—hearing, sight, speech. For the existence of the two first of these the following verses are quoted, "He truly heareth and knoweth all things." (Súra xliv. 5). "No vision taketh in Him, but He taketh in all vision." (Súra vi. 103).
The use of the terms sitting, rising, &c., hands, face, eyes, and so on, gave rise as I have shown to several sub-divisions of the Sifátians. Al-Ghazzálí says: "He sits upon His throne after that manner which He has Himself described and in that sense which He Himself means, which is a sitting far remote from any notion of contact or resting upon, or local situation." This is the Ash'arían idea, but between the Ash'aríans and those who fell into the error of the Mujassimians, there was another school. The followers of Imám Ibn Hanbal say that such words represent the attributes existing in God. The words "God sits on His throne" mean that He has the power of sitting. Thus, they say, "We keep the literal meaning of the words, we allow no figurative interpretation. To do so is to introduce a dangerous principle of interpretation, for the negation of the apparent sense of a passage may tend to weaken the authority of revelation. At the same time we do not pretend to explain the act, for it is written: 'There is none like unto Him.' (Súra cxii.) 'Nought is there like Him.' (Súra xlii. 9.) 'Unworthy the estimate they form of God.'" (Súra xxii. 73.) To prove that God occupies a place they produce the following Tradition: "Ibn-al-Hákim wished to give liberty to a female slave Saouda and consulted the Prophet about it. Muhammad said to her, 'Where is God?' 'In heaven,' she replied. 'Set her at liberty, she is a true believer.'" Not, say the Commentators, because she believed that God occupied a place but because she took the words in their literal signification. The Shí'ahs consider it wrong to attribute to God movement, quiescence, &c, for these imply the possession of a body. They hold, too, in opposition to the orthodox that God will never be seen, for that which is seen is limited by space.
The seventh attribute—speech—has been fruitful of a very long and important controversy connected with the nature of the Qurán, for the word "Kalám" means not mere speech, but revelation and every other mode of communicating intelligence. Al-Ghazzálí says:—
"He doth speak, command, forbid, promise, and threaten by an eternal ancient word, subsisting in His essence. Neither is it like to the word of the creatures, nor doth it consist in a voice arising from the commotion of the air and the collision of bodies, nor letters which are separated by the joining together of the lips or the motion of the tongue. The Qurán, the Law, the Gospel and the Psalter are books sent down by Him to His Apostles, and the Qurán, indeed, is read with tongues written in books, and is kept in hearts; yet, as subsisting in the essence of God, it doth not become liable to separation and division whilst it is transferred into the hearts and on to paper. Thus Moses also heard the word of God without voice or letter, even as the saints behold the essence of God without substance or accident."