The orthodox belief is that Muhammad is now an Intercessor and will be so at the Last Day. The intercession then is of several kinds. There is the 'great intercession' to which the words, "it may be that thy Lord will raise thee to a glorious station," (Súra xvii. 81) are supposed to refer. The Maqám-i-mahmúd, (glorious station), is said to be the place of intercession in which all persons will praise the Prophet. In the Zád-ul-Masír it is said that the Maqám-i-mahmúd refers to the fact that God will place the Prophet on His Throne. Others say that it is a place in which a standard will be given to the Prophet, around whom all the other prophets will then gather to do him honour. The first interpretation is, however, the ordinary one. The people will be in great fear. Muhammad will say: "O my people! I am appointed for intercession." Their fear will then pass away. The second intercession is made so that they may enter into Paradise without rendering an account. The authorities differ with regard to this.
The third intercession is on behalf of those Muslims who
ought to go to hell. The fourth for those who are already there. No one but the Prophet can make these intercessions. The fifth intercession is for an increase of rank to those who are in Paradise. The Mutazilites maintained that there would be no intercession for Muslims guilty of great sins, and adduced in favour of their opinion the verse: "Fear ye the day when soul shall not satisfy for soul at all, nor shall any intercession be accepted from them, nor shall any ransom be taken, neither shall they be helped." (Súra ii. 45). The orthodox bring in reply this Hadís-i-Sahíh: "The Prophet said: 'my intercession is for the men of my following who have committed great sins.'" If this Tradition is disputed, they then say that the verse in the Qurán just quoted does not refer to Muslims at all, but to the Infidels.
According to a Tradition related by Anas the Prophet said: "In the day of resurrection Musalmáns will not be able to move, and they will be greatly distressed and say: 'would to God that we had asked Him to create some one to intercede for us, that we might be taken from this place, and be delivered from tribulation and sorrow.'" The Tradition goes on to state how they sought help from Adam and the prophets of the old dispensation, who, one and all, excused themselves on account of their own sinfulness. At length Moses told them to go to Jesus, the Apostle of God, the Spirit of God and the Word of God. They did so and Jesus said: "Go to Muhammad who is a servant, whose sins God has forgiven both first and last." The Prophet continued, according to the Tradition, "then the Musalmáns will come to me, and I will ask permission to go into God's presence and intercede for them."
The second advent of Christ is a sign of the last day. "Jesus is no more than a servant whom We favoured ... and he shall be a sign of the last hour." (Súra xliii. 61). He will not, according to the Qurán, come as a judge, but like other prophets to be judged. "We formed with them (i.e. prophets) a strict covenant, that God may question the men of truth as to their truth, (i.e. how they have discharged their prophetic functions)." (Súra xxxiii. 7, 8). He will come to bear witness against the Jews who reject him: "In the day of resurrection, He will be a witness against them." (Súra iv. 158).
It is necessary to believe in the pond of the Prophet called Kausar. This faith is founded on the verse "Truly we have given thee an abundance." (Súra cviii. 1). Bukhárí says: "The meaning of Kausar is the 'abundance of good' which God gives to the Prophet. Abu Básh said to one Sa'íd, 'the people think that Kausar is a river of Paradise.' Sa'íd replied, 'Kausar is a river in which there is abundance of good.'" According to the same authority Muhammad said: "My pond is square, its water is whiter than milk, its perfume better than that of musk, whosoever drinks thereof will thirst no more."
There are many degrees of felicity in heaven to which the believers are admitted. The Prophet, according to Tirmízí, said there were one hundred. Some of these may possibly be meant by the eight names they give to Paradise. (1.) Jannat-ul-Khuld. "Say: Is this, or the Garden of Eternity which was promised to the God-fearing, best?" (Súra xxv. 16.) (2.) Jannat-us-Salám. "For them is a Dwelling of Peace with their Lord." (Súra vi. 127.) (3.) Dár-ul-Qarár. "The life to come is the Mansion which abideth." (Súra xl. 42.) (4.) Jannat-ul-'Adan. "To the Faithful, both men and women, God promiseth gardens and goodly mansions in the Garden of Eden." (Súra ix. 73.) (5.) Jannat-ul-Mawá. "Near which is the Garden of Repose." (Súra liii. 15.) (6) Jannat-un-Na'ím. "Amid delights shall the righteous dwell." (Súra lxxxii. 13.) (7) Jannat-ul-Illiyún. "The register of the righteous isin Illiyún." (Súra lxxxiii. 18,) (8.) Jannat-ul-Firdaus. "Those who believe and do the things that are right, they shall have the Gardens of Paradise for their abode." (Súra xviii. 107.)
Hell is said to have seven divisions. The Qurán, though it mentions the names of these divisions, does not state what classes of persons will be sent to each; but Muslim Commentators have supplied the needed information. They classify them thus:—(1.) Jahannam, for sinners who die without repentance. (2.) Lazwá, for the infidels (i.e., Christians.) (3.) Hutama, a fire for Jews, and according to some for Christians. (4.) Sa'ir, for devils, the descendants of Iblís. (5.) Saqar, for the magians: also for those who neglect prayer. (6.) Jahím, a boiling caldron for idolaters: also for Gog and Magog. (7.) Háwía, a bottomless pit for hypocrites. It is said that heaven has one division more than hell to show that God's mercy exceeds His justice.
The Muhammadan writers give very full and minute accounts of the events connected with the resurrection, judgment and future state of those who are lost, and of those who are saved. Sale gives such an excellent summary of these opinions, that it is not necessary to enter into details here. The orthodox belief is that the statements in the Qurán and the Traditions regarding the pleasures of Paradise are to be taken literally.
6. The Predestination of good and evil.—I have already in the section in which the attribute "will" is described (p. 118) given some account of the dogmatic statements concerning the doctrine of predestination; but as it always forms a distinct chapter in Musalmán books, I treat it separately here. Having, however, in the passage referred to, given Al Berkevi's words on the attribute "will," it is only necessary to make a short extract from his dogmatic statement concerning Predestination. He says:—
"It is necessary to confess that good and evil take place by the predestination and predetermination of God, that all that has been and all that will be was decreed in eternity, and written on the preserved table; that the faith of the believer, the piety of the pious and good actions are foreseen, willed, predestinated, decreed by the writing on the preserved table, produced and approved by God; that the unbelief of the unbeliever, the impiety of the impious and bad actions come to pass with the fore-knowledge, will, predestination and decree of God, but not with His satisfaction and approval. Should any ask why God willeth and produceth evil, we can only reply that He may have wise ends in view which we cannot comprehend."
Another confession of faith has:—
"Whoever shall say, that God is not delighted with virtue and faith, and is not wroth with vice and infidelity, or that God has decreed good and evil with equal complacency is an infidel."
There are three well-defined schools of thought on the subject:—
First.—The Jabríans, so called from the word "jabr" compulsion, deny all free agency in man and say that man is necessarily constrained by the force of God's eternal and immutable decree to act as he does. They hold that as God is the absolute Lord, He can, if He so wills, admit all men into Paradise, or cast all into hell. This sect is one of the branches of the Ash'aríans with whom on most points they agree.
Secondly.—The Qadríans, who deny Al-Qadr, or God's absolute decree, say that evil and injustice ought not to be attributed to God but to man, who is altogether a free agent. God has given him the power to do or not to do an act. This sect is generally considered to be a branch of the Mutazilite body, though in reality it existed before Wásil quitted the school of his master Hasan . As Wásil, however, followed the opinions of Mábad-al-Johní, the leading Kadrían divine, the Mutazilites and Qadríans are practically one and the same.
Thirdly.—The Ash'aríans, of whom I have already given some account, maintain that God has one eternal will which is applied to whatsoever He willeth, both of His own actions and those of men; that He willeth that which He knoweth and what is written on the preserved table; that He willeth both good and evil. So far they agree with the Jabríans; but then they seem to allow some power to man, a tenet I have already explained when describing their idea of "Kasb" . The orthodox, or Sunní belief is theoretically Ash'arían, but practically the Sunnís are confirmed Jabríans. The Mutazilite doctrines are looked upon as quite heretical.
No subject has been more warmly discussed in Islám than that of predestination. The following abstract of some lengthy discussions will present the points of difference.
The Ash'aríans, who in this matter represent in the main orthodox views, formulate their objections to the Mutazilite system thus:—
(i). If man is the causer of an action by the force of his own will, then he should also have the power of controlling the result of that action.
(ii). If it be granted that man has the power to originate an act it is necessary that he should know all acts, because a creator should be independent in act and choice. Intention must be conditioned by knowledge. To this the Mutazilites well reply that a man need not know the length of a road before he walks, or the structure of the throat before he talks.
(iii). Suppose a man wills to move his body and God at the same time wills it to be steady, then if both intentions come to pass there will be a collection of opposites; if neither, a removal of opposites; if the exaltation of the first, an unreasonable preference.
(iv). If man can create an act, some of his works will be better than some of the works of God, e.g. a man determines to have faith: now faith is a better thing than reptiles, which are created by God.
(v). If man is free to act, why can he not make at once a human body; why does he need to thank God for grace and faith?
(vi). But better far than all argument, the orthodox say, is the testimony of the Book. "All things have we created under a fixed decree." (Súra liv. 49). "When God created you and that ye make." (Súra xxxvii. 94). "Some of them there were whom God guided and there were others decreed to err." (Súra xvi. 38). As God decrees faith and obedience He must be the causer of it, for "on the hearts of these hath God graven the Faith." (Súra lviii. 22). "It is he who causeth you to laugh and weep, to die and make alive." (Súra liii. 44). "If God pleased He would surely bring them, one and all, to the guidance." (Súra vi. 36). "Had God pleased, He had guided you all aright." (Súra vi. 150). "Had the Lord pleased, He would have made mankind of one religion." (Súra xi. 120). "God will mislead whom he pleaseth, and whom He pleaseth He will place upon the straight path." (Súra vi. 39.) Tradition records that the Prophet said: "God is the maker of all makers and of their actions."
The Mutazilites took up the opposite side of this great question and said:—
(i). If man has no power to will or to do, then what is the difference between praising God and sinning against Him; between faith and infidelity; good and evil; what is the use of commands and prohibitions; rewards and punishments; promises and threats; what is the use of prophets, books, &c.
(ii). Some acts of men are bad, such as tyranny and polytheism. If these are created by God, it follows that to tyrannise and to ascribe plurality to the Deity is to render obedience. To this the Ash'aríans reply that orders are of two kinds, immediate and mediate. The former which they call "Amr-i-takwíti," is the order, "Be and it was." This comprehends all existences, and according to it whatever is ordered must come to pass. The latter they call "Amr-i-tashri'í," an order given in the Law. This comes to men through prophets and thus is to be obeyed. True obedience is to act according to that which is revealed, not according to the secret intentions of God, for that we know not.
(iii). If God decrees the acts of men, He should bear the name of that which he decrees. Thus the causer of infidelity is an infidel; of tyranny a tyrant, and so on; but to speak thus of God is blasphemy.
(iv). If infidelity is decreed by God He must wish it; but a prophet desires faith and obedience and so is opposed to God. To this the orthodox reply, that God knows by His eternal knowledge that such a man will die an infidel. If a prophet intends by bringing the message of salvation to such an one to make God's knowledge become ignorance, he would be doing wrong; but as he does not know the secret decrees of God, his duty is to deliver his message according to the Hadís: "A prophet has only to deliver the clear message."
(v). The Mutazilites claimed as on their side all verses of the Qurán, in which the words to do, to construct, to renew, to create, &c., are applied to men. Such are the verses: "Whatever is in the heavens and in the earth is God's that He may reward those who do evil according to their deeds: and those who do good will He reward with good things." (Súra liii. 32). "Whoso shall have wrought evil shall not be recompensed but with its like: but whoso shall have done the things that are right, whether male or female and is a believer, these shall enter Paradise." (Súra xl. 43). Say: "the truth is from the Lord; let him then who will believe; and let him who will, be an infidel." (Súra xviii. 28). "Those who add Gods to God will say: 'If God had pleased neither we nor our fathers had given Him companions.' Say: 'Verily ye follow only a conceit, ye utter lies.'" (Súra vi. 149). The Hadís is also very plain. "All good is in Thy hands and evil is not to Thee." (Al-khair kuluhu fí yadaika wash-sharru laisa 'alaika.)
The Ash'aríans have one famous text which they bring to bear against all this reasoning and evidence. It is: "This truly is a warning; and whoso willeth, taketh the way of his Lord; but will it ye shall not, unless God will it, for God is knowing, wise." (Súra lxxvi. 29, 30). To the Hadís they reply (1) that there is a difference between acquiescence in evil and decreeing it. Thus the expression "God willeth not tyranny for His servants," does not mean that God hath not decreed it, but that tyranny is not one of His attributes: so "evil is not to Thee" means it is not an attribute of God; and (2) the Hadís must be explained in accordance with the teaching of the Qurán.
The Muslim philosophers tried to find a way out of the difficulty. Averhoes says: "We are free to act in this way or that, but our will is always determined by some exterior cause. For example, we see something which pleases us, we are drawn to it in spite of ourselves. Our will is thus bound by exterior causes. These causes exist according to a certain order of things which is founded on the general laws of nature. God alone knows before hand the necessary connection which to us is a mystery. The connection of our will with exterior causes is determined by the laws of nature. It is this which in theology we call, 'decrees and predestination.'"
I have already shown how, as Islám grew into a system, the Muslims fell into a Cabbalism, and a superstitious reverence for the mere letters and words of the Qurán. With this declension came a still more distorted view of the character of God. The quotations made from the Qurán in the last few pages will have shown that whilst some passages seem to attribute freedom to man and speak of his consequent responsibility, others teach a clear and distinct fatalism. The great strength of Islám lay in the energy with which Muhammad preached the doctrine that God was a divine Ruler, one who would deal righteous judgment, who "taught man that which he knew not." As the system became more complex and dogmatic—a very necessary result of its first principles—men lost the sense of the nearness of God. He became an unapproachable being. A harsh unfeeling Fate took the place of the Omnipotent Ruler. It is this dark fatalism which, whatever the Qurán may teach on the subject, is the ruling principle in all Muslim communities. It is this which makes all Muhammadan nations decay. Careless of self-improvement, heedless of the need of progress, the Muslim nations, still independent, are in all that relates to the higher aspects of intellectual and civilized life far behind the nations of the west.
The subject of 'Ilm-i-Aqáíd, or the science of dogma properly ends here, but most Muslim treatises include in this branch of the subject a few practical remarks. I therefore add a summary of them here. The believer who commits murder, fornication, &c., does not cease to be a Muslim provided that he does not say that these are allowed: should he die unrepentant, God can punish him for a while in hell, or forgive him without punishment. The Hadd, a punishment based on a Záhir, or obvious sentence of the Qurán requires that a Muslim who apostatizes shall be put to death. In the case of an apostate woman, Imám Abu Hanífa ruled that she should be imprisoned and beaten every day. The other three Imáms, Málik, Sháfa'í and Hanbal said that she should be put to death in accordance with the Tradition which says: "He who changes his religion, kill." The Arabic word "man," usually translated "He who" is of common gender, and so these Imáms include women in the list of those who, after apostasy, are to be killed. God does not pardon polytheism and infidelity; but He can, if He willeth, pardon all other crimes. If any one is asked, "dost thou believe?" he should reply, "I am truly a believer," and not say: "If God willeth." If any one says to him: "Wilt thou die in the faith?" he should reply: "I do not know, God knows." Except when speaking of prophets, or of those of whom the Prophets have spoken, such as Abu Bakr, Omar, Osmán and 'Alí, it must not be said of any one, "he is gone to Paradise," for God only knows his state. Prayer should be made for a deceased Muslim whether he was a good or bad man. To give alms, to read the Qurán, to perform other good works, and to apply the merit thus gained to the souls of the dead is a pious and beneficial act.